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THE JONES ACT. REMEDIES OF SEAMEN.
GEORGE W. STUMEERG*
Originally, the maritime law, as it was conceived to be by the
Supreme Court of the United States, permitted no recovery by a seaman
for injuries incurred as the result of the negligence of a fellow crewman.
At the same time a seaman who became ill or suffered injury while in the
service of his ship was entitled, without regard to fault, to "maintenance"
and "cure", and to wages, at least as long as the voyage continued. Also,
if he incurred injury because of the unseaworthiness of the vessel or of its
appliances, again without regard to fault, he was entitled to indemnity.
1
The Seamen's Act of 1920, or, as it is usually called, the Jones Act,
extended to seamen the benefits already conferred upon railway em-
ployees by the Federal Employers' Liability Act.' Since the act did not
purport to affect in any way the preexisting maritime law, a seaman who
is injured or becomes ill during the period of his service to his ship now
has three routes over which he may travel in his quest for compensation.
If his injury is due to the negligence of a member of his crew, he may
recover indemnity under the Jones Act. If it is due to unseaworthiness he
may also recover indemnity, but under the traditional maritime law. In
any event, unless the seaman has done something which forfeits his
claim, he is entitled to maintenance and cure.
MAINTENANCE AND CURE
The underlying principles of maintenance and cure are apparently
as old as maritime commerce in the Mediterranean area. Early codes
refer to the doctrine, which, of course, has no common-law counterpart. 8
Mr. Justice Story4 described its underlying reasons in the following
language:
The protection of seamen, who, as a class, are poor, friend-
less and improvident, from the hazards of illness and abandon-
ment while ill in foreign ports; the inducement to masters and
owners to protect the safety and health of seamen while in
service; the maintenance of a merchant marine for the com-
mercial service and maritime defense of the nation by inducing
men to accept employment in an arduous and perilous service.
The duty of the vessel and her owner to provide maintenance and
cure for seamen injured or falling ill while in service is said to arise from
*Professor of Law, University of Texas.
1 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). The libellant was injured as the result of
the negligence of the master. The Supreme Court, reversing the lower federal
courts, denied recovery on the ground that recovery for injuries to seamen is limited
to maintenance and cure and to unseaworthiness. In 1915 Congress provided
that a seaman having command is not a fellow servant. In Chelentis v. Luckenbach
S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918), the Supreme Court held that this legislation added
nothing to the maritime law. The next step was the Jones Act. See note 2.
241 Stat. 1007 (1902) ,46 U.S.C. §688 (1952).
3 See Justice Brown in the Osceola, note 1 supra.
4 Harden v. Gordon, Fed. Cas. No. 6,04-7 (C.C.D.Me. 1823).
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the contract of employment.5 The award is not made as compensation for
the disability suffered. The injured party cannot recover a lump sum6
except when there is a failure to comply with the duty, in which case he
may recover consequential damages.7 In the case of Calmar S. S. Corp. v.
Taylor' Mr. Justice Stone said that "maintenance" is comparable to that
to which the seaman is entitled at sea and "cure" is care including nursing
and medical attention. The disability need not be service-connected. In
Smith v. United States,' for example, maintenance and cure was allowed
a seaman who sprained an ankle at the home of a friend after signing the
ship's articles. A similar result was reached where the seaman contracted
amoebic dysentery, whether in the service of the ship or not;"0 and in the
case of Warren v. United States" a majority of the Supreme Court al-
lowed a claim where the seaman fell from a window ledge at a dance
hall when on shore leave. Claims have been allowed even where the
injury was the result of a barroom fist fight.'" A similar position was
taken where the injury was incurred on a bus on which the seaman was
going to visit a relative.'" Contributory negligence does not bar re-
covery.' 4 It has been held, however, that a claim will not be allowed
where the injury results from intoxication,' 5 and the same result was
reached where the seaman had contracted syphilis.'6 While the right to
recover wages terminates with the voyage, it has been stated that where
the seaman is employed for a designated period of time rather than for
a voyage, as is often the case in the intercoastal trade, wages for the fixed
period are recoverable.' As already stated, "cure" includes medical care
and hospitalization; maintenance is usually allowed at the rate of several
dollars a day as long as the duty continues.1 8 It should be added that the
r See Cardozo, J., in Cortes v. Baltimore Insural Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932).
6 Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938).
7 Cf. Sims v. United States War Shipping Administration, 186 F. 2d 972, (3rd
Cir. 1951) cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816.
8 See Note 6 supra.
9 Smith v. United States, 167 F. 2d 550, (4th Cir. 1948).
10 Spahn v. United States, 171 F. 2d 980 (4th Cir. 1949).
11 Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, (1951).
12 Nowery v. Smith, 69 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Pa. 1946), aff'd, 161 F. 2d 732
(3rd Cir. 1947).
I8 Gaynor v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 751 (E.D.Pa. 1950).
14 Cf. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 318 U.S. 724, 731 (1943).
1 Barlow v. Pan Atlantic S.S.Co., 101 F. 2d 697 (2d Cir. 1939).
1 6 Zambrano v. Moore McCormick Lines, 131 F. 2d 537 (2d Cir. 1942).
17 See McManus v. Marine Transport Lines, Inc., 149 F. 2d 969 (2d Cir.
1945) ; Enochasson v. Freeport Sulphur Co., 7 F. 2d 674. (S.D.Tex. 1925) ; Farrell
v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
18 In the case of Robinson v. Swayne and Hort, Ltd., 33 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.
Cal. 1940), it was held that maintenance as well as cure can only be recovered
to the extent that the seaman has been out of pocket. There is no clear cut rule
as to maintenance. The amount which may be allowable varies according to
circumstances. In the Robinson case the respondent was willing to pay two
dollars a day. Probably the average would be five or six dollars a day.
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obligation continues only so long as cure is practicable." If, for example,
a seaman loses a leg, the obligations of the owner cease upon his medical
discharge. It should be emphasized that the obligation of the owner is
absolute, and breach gives rise to a claim for consequential damages even
though the owner or his representatives may have acted in good faith.
For example, in the case of Sims v. United States2" recovery of con-
sequential damages was allowed even though the respondent in good
faith thought that the plaintiff was "a malingerer or liar."
UNSEAWORTHINESS
The doctrine of liability because of unseaworthiness received fresh
impetus in the case of MVahnich v. Southern S. S. Co.2' The seaman was
;njured at sea by a fall from a staging on which he was standing while
painting the bridge. The evidence showed that a piece of defective rope
had been used in rigging the staging. There was sound rope on board.
The trial court held that suit was brought too late under the Jones Act
and denied recovery. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, by a
divided court, affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that
the staging from which the seaman fell was inadequate for the purpose
for which it was used and so was unseaworthy. The thesis of the majority
was that recovery can be had where the issue of seaworthiness is involved
whether failure to observe the defect is due to negligence or is unavoid-
able. Mr. Justice Roberts, with whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred,
dissented on the ground that the injury was not the consequence of un-
seaworthiness (the defective rope) but of the negligence of the ship's
officer in selecting the rope. Responsibility for this negligence was pro-
vided for by the Jones Act, but, because of the running of the limitation
period, recovery could not be had under it. The further position of the
dissent was that application of the doctrine of seaworthiness to a case
such as this, one involving the use of improper applicances, would impose
an unwarranted burden on shipping.
Responsibility because of unseaworthiness was recently extended so
as to include a duty to furnish a proper crew.2 2 The plaintiff was attacked
19 Cf. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938). The seaman
developed Buerger's disease. His leg was amputated. He had been paid a total
sum of $487.00. He then brought suit alleging negligence. The trial court found
there was no negligence but allowed recovery of $7,000 on the ground that his
disease was permanent and incurable. This the Supreme Court held to be im-
proper. Mr. Justice Stone took the position that maintenance is not compensable
by a lump sum judgment even though the injury or disease may be incurable.
Recovery can only be had for the sums due as they accumulate. He did, however.
state that other considerations might apply where the injury is service connected.
In any event each case is to be determined on its peculiar facts.
20 Sims v. United States War Shipping Administiation, 186 F. 2d 972 (3rd
Cir. 1951).
21 Mahnich v. Southern S.S.Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
22 Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S.Co., Inc., 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
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by another member of the crew and severely beaten. The court below
found that the attacker was of a savage disposition, capable of en-
dangering the lives of others. The Supreme Court held that the proper
character of the crew is as much a part of seaworthiness as is soundness
of hull, machinery and ship's appliances. While an ordinary assault
would not give rise to liability because of unseaworthiness, in a case such
as this it would, even though there was no negligence in hiring the sea-
man. Other typical instances of recovery because of unseaworthiness in-
clude the following cases: Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandangeri3 The
H. 4. Scandre?4 and Krey v. United States.25 In the Carlisle Packing
Co. case the injury was due to an explosion caused by pouring gasoline
to start a fire from a can which ordinarily contained coal oil. In the
Scandret case the seaman, while trying to open a door, pulled off the
knob and fell into an open hatch. In the Krey case there were no handles
on the sides of a shower bath. The seaman slipped and fell.
NEGLIGENCE. THE JONEs ACT.
Congressional extension of the Federal Employers' Liability Act to
injuries incurred by seamen took place during a period when the Supreme
Court was cutting a tortuous trail with respect to the application of state
workmen's compensation acts to injuries suffered by harbor workers,
principally longshoremen." If the injury occurred on board a vessel in
the course of maritime employment, application of state law was held to
be unconstitutional on the ground that the application of the state act to
such injuries would materially disturb the uniformity of the general
maritime law in its interstate and international relations." The Jones
Act provides that any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment "may, at his election, maintain (under the Act)
an action for damages at law, with the right to trial by jury". It was
contended in the case of Panana R.R. Co. v. Johnson28 that the effect
of the words just quoted was to withdraw from admiralty jurisdiction
suits by seamen when recovery is sought under the Jones Act. Its effect,
so it was contended, was such that if suit were brought on the common-
law side with trial by jury, the federal act would control; but if suit
were brought in admiralty, traditional maritime law would govern.
Consequently the act materially impinged upon the general maritime
law as administered in admiralty. The position of the Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Van Devanter, was that although Congress
23 Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922).
24 The H. A. Scandret, 87 F. 2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937).
2r Krey v. United States, 123 F. 2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1941).
20 See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), and cases cited
in note 27 infra.
27 Cf. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) ; State Industrial
Commission v. Nordenkolt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922); Grant Smith-Porter Ship
Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
2 8 Panama R.R.Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
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may not impair the judicial power of the federal courts over "admiralty
and maritime cases," it may enact legislation concerning maritime affairs.
The Jones Act did no more than add a new cause of action to the
maritime law. The further position was that Congress did not withdraw
claims of seamen, when arising out of the newly created right, from
admiralty jurisdiction. It merely provided for an election to sue under
the act in a commonlaw court, with right to trial by jury, or under the
act in admiralty where traditionally there is no jury. As a consequence
a seaman injured in the course of his employment may, assuming proper
venue, sue under the act in a federal court on the admiralty side, in a
federal court on the common-law side, or in a state court. In any event
the validity of his claim is determined by the federal statute.
The initial burden of proving negligence under the Jones Act is, of
course, on the plaintiff seaman. Under both traditional maritime law and
the act, contributory negligence is not a defense. The comparative
degree of the negligence of the plaintiff or libellant as a contributing
cause operates to reduce the amount of the recovery to which he would
have been entitled had he not been negligent. The defendant has here
the burden of proof."0 Because of the more protracted intimacy of a
seaman with his ship, the types of situations where recovery may be had
on proper proof are more varied than is the case with land employees.
For example, in Her v. Moran Towing & Transportation Co..31 ill-
ness caused by damp quarters was held to be a proper basis for recovery.
Again, in Alpha S. S. Corp. v. Cain, 2 recovery was permitted where a
superior struck the plaintiff; and in Koehler v. Presque-Isle Transport
Co.,33 suit was allowed where the plaintiff had been beaten by a fellow
seaman, on the ground that the ship's officers knew or should have known
the seaman's vicious character. In De Zon v. American President Lines,"4
while there was disagreement as to the existence of negligence, the owner
was held to be responsible for the negligence of the ship's doctor even
though there was no negligence in selecting him. Recovery because of
negligent failure to render aid to a deckhand who fell overboard and
was drowned was upheld in Di Nicola v. Penna. R. Co.3 5
29 See The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936); Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939). In both cases, the first involving the Jones
Act and the second seaworthiness, the matter in question was assumption of risk
as contributory or, alternatively, comparative negligence. The Employers Liability
Act was amended in 1939 so that now the employee does not assume the risk in
any case where the death or injury results from the negligence of officers, agents
or employees of the carrier. See 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §54 (1952).
30 See Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
31 Hem v. Moran Towing & Transportation Co., 138 F. 2d 900 (2d Cir. 1943).
32Alpha S.S.Corp. v. Cain, 281 U.S. 642 (1930).
33 Koehler v. Presque-Isle Transport Co., 141 F. 2d 490 (2d Cir. 1944).
34 De Zon v. American President Lines, 318 U.S. 660 (1943).
The obligation to furnish medical care may also arise out of the duty to
furnish maintenance and cure. See note 20, supra. In the Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240
(1903), the libellant when aloft fell to the deck breaking two ribs and a leg.
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Reference has been made to the attack on the Jones Act on grounds
of unconstitutionality, and to the resulting interpretation to the effect
that suit may be brought, alternatively, in admiralty, or in a state court,
or on the common-law side of a federal court, assuming always proper
venue. 6 The same alternatives apply when suit is for maintenance and
cure or for indemnity for injuries due to unseaworthiness3 7 Maritime
law, even when judge-made, is federal law. But beginning with the
Judicature Act as enacted by the First Congress there has been "saved"
to suitors a common-law remedy."8 The applicable substantive law is the
maritime law, but suit may be brought to enforce a maritime claim in a
state court, or on the common-law side of a federal court with trial
there under common-law practices as modified by statute.3 9 An action
in rem is not a common-law remedy and will only lie in admiralty.
4
Although a seaman has a lien on the ship for his traditional maritime
claims,41 this lien can only be enforced through a libel in admiralty.
However, the Jones Act does not create a maritime lien, so even if suit
is brought on the admiralty side, there is no lien to enforce.
In the absence of some statute to the contrary, a cause of action
does not, under the general maritime law, survive death.42 Consequently
The master set the leg. When the splints were removed the leg seemed to be in
good condition. Upon arrival at the ship's destination it was found that the
bones of the leg had not united. Recovery below of a judgment for $3,000 was
affirmed on the ground that the ship, a sailing vessel, should have put into the
nearest port even though this would have added a week to the voyage. For
a case where suit was based on negligence, see Joshua Hendy Corp. v. Clavel,
189 F. 2d 37 (9th Cir. 1951). There had been a failure to equip the vessel with
proper medicines, to communicate with other ships, and to put into a port within
a day's run away.
39 DiNicola v. Penna R. Co., 158 F. 2d 856 (2d Cir. 1946).
3 7 Prior receipt of maintenance and cure does not preclude recovery under
the Jones Act or for unseaworthiness. However, personal injury for which recovery
may be had under the Jones Act, or, alternatively, because of unseaworthiness,
gives rise to a single cause of action. An independent suit may be brought for
maintenance and cure. Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928). The
cumulative nature of maintenance and cure applies whether suit is at common
law or in admiralty. For a case where suit was brought in a state court for
maintenance and cure as well as for damages under the Jones Act, see Garrett
v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942). For a case involving suit on
the common law side of a federal court for maintenance and cure, see Jordine v.
Walling, 185 F. 2d 662 (3rd Cir. 1950).
3 8 The Judicature Act of 1789 §9, 1 STAT. 76, 28 U.S.C. §1333 (1952).
30 See Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918) ; Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
40 The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall 555, 18 L.Ed. 451 (1867).
41 See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). As to Jones Act, see Plamals v.
S.S. "Pinar del Rio", 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
42 The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). The Death on the High Seas
Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C.A. §761 creates a cause of action for a death caused by
"wrongful act, neglect or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine
league from the shore of any state . . ." If the cause of action accrueQ within
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if a claim is one for maintenance and cure or one based on unseaworthi-
ness, it comes to an end with the death of the daimant.43 On the other
hand.the Federal Employers' Liability Act creates a cause of action for
wrongful death. As a result the survivors, for whom suit may be
brought by the personal representative, can only recover upon a theory
of negligence.
WHO ARE SEAMEN
In order for an employee to be a seaman and hence entitled to
relief as such, his work must relate to the operation and navigation of a
ship or vessel.44 However, the inclusiveness of the term "seaman" is
broader than a landsman might think. As put by Judge Benedict:43
The term mariner includes all persons employed on board
ships and vessels, during the voyage, to assist in their navigation
and preservation, or to promote the purposes of the voyage.
Masters, mates, sailors, surveyors, carpenters, coopers, stewards,
cooks, cabin boys, kitchen boys, engineers, pilots, firemen, deck
hands, wireless telegraph operators, waiters,--women as well
as men,--are mariners.
Whether a particular structure is a ship is a matter which has been
before the federal courts on a number of occasions. Obviously the mere
fact that it floats on water does not make it one. In Cope v. Vallette Dry
Dock Co..." for example, a floating drydock was held not to be a ship or
vessel-since "it was not designed for navigation and could not be practi-
cally used therefor." Again, in the early case of The Hendrick Hudson,7
an old steamship, which had been stripped of its boilers, engines and
paddles and was used as a floating bar and hotel, was said not to be a
ship. While these cases did not involve personal injury claims, presuma-
bly employees whose work is in connection with structures of this type
are not seamen, nor even maritime workers. On the other hand, dredges,
the three mile limit of a state, local state law will be given effect in admiralty.
The City of Norwalk, 55 Fed. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1893). Neither the federal statute
nor state law applies to the traditional maritime claims of seamen since these
statutes give relief for 'wrongful death.
43 Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930) ; Cortes v. Baltimore Insular
Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932).
44In Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S., (1946), a longshoreman was
denied the right to sue his employer under the Jones Act on the ground that
injuries incurred by longshoremen are covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act. In an earlier case decided prior to the enactment
of the Act a contrary result was reached on the ground that longshoremen per-
form functions which were originally performed by seamen. International Steve-
dorifng Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
45 1 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY 253 (6th ed., Knauth 1940).
46 Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625 (1S37).
4 7 The Hendrick Hudson, 11 Fed. Cas. 1085, No. 6,355 (S.D.N.Y. 1869).
Cf., accord, Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co.,
271 U.S. 19 (1926), a floating wharf.
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scows and barges are as much ships as are the Queen, Mary and the
United States. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Larson4" is an excellent illustration.
A seagoing dredge was engaged in dredging the entrance to Miami
harbor. The dredgings were loaded into scows which were taken several
miles from land by another tug, where the dredgings were dumped. One
Burrows was employed by the master of the dredge; he was fed and
quartered.aboard her but signed no articles and was not an experienced
sailor. He worked aboard a scow on daily shifts of eight hours doing
what was necessary for her navigation and attending to dumping and
cleaning her at sea. He was killed, and a claim was made for compensa-
tion under the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act.49 Since that act excludes from its scope "a member of
the crew of any vessel" his status was decisive as to the allowance of the
claim. The position of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was
that Burrows, though not an articled seaman, was attached to the dredge
and her scow as a member of the ship's company. "He was a member
of the crew. When the scow was taken in tow by the tug-he may be
considered a member of this composite crew" (of the tug and the scow).
It might be added here that while the term "seaman" as used in some
federal statutes does not include ship's officers, they have been included
by judicial decision in the coverage of the Jones Act."
The waters navigated by his craft do not affect the status of an
employee as a seaman. Admiralty jurisdiction in England never included
inland waters but, although there was considerable hesitancy in earlier
cases in the United States to extend the waters included within admiralty
jurisdiction above those affected by the ebb and flow of the tide,5' pre-
existing doubts were dispelled by the Supreme Court in the case of The
Hine v. Trevor52 in which it was decided that the Mississippi River above
St. Louis is- within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Again, in Ex
Parte Boyer 3 the Court held an artificial canal connecting Lake Michigan
with the Illinois River to be within the maritime jurisdiction of the federal
courts. However, land-locked lakes lying wholly within the territorial
48 Maryland Gas. Co. v. Lawson, 94- F. 2d 190 (5th Cir. 1938). See also
Charles Barnes Co. v. Pine Dredge Boat, 169 Fed. 895 (E.D.Ky. 1909), in which
the cases, not always in accord, are reviewed.
4944 STAT. 142 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §901-950 (1952).
50 Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 (1934).
U1 For a discussion, see The Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How.
443, (1851). The Court in this case upheld an act of Feb. 26, 1845, extending
limited admiralty jurisdiction to the Great Lakes and their connecting waters.
The act provided for trial by jury. It has been in effect repealed but for some
reason the provision for trial by jury has been retained. However, the right to
trial by jury does not apply when suit is in admiralty for maintenance and cure.
52 MIcH L. REv. 139 (1953).
52 The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, (1867).
-)I Fx Parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884).
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limits of a state have been held by some courts not to be maritime."4
Probably, it can be accurately said that waters, fresh or salt, susceptible
of being navigated as highways of interstate or international water-borne
commerce, are, from the American point of view, maritime.5s Conse-
quently all craft navigating such waters are within admiralty jurisdiction,
and their employees, when engaged in furthering the purposes of their
navigation, are seamen and so are entitled as such to any relief afforded
by either the Jones Act or the traditional "law of the sea."
CONCLUSIONS
If one considers the nature of the three distinct bases for recovery
by seamen for injuries incurred while in the employ of their ship, it is not
surprising that seamen's unions have opposed extension of Workmen's
Compensation coverage to the members. While "maintenance and cure"
is not as extensive as compensation coverage, in that it is more limited as
to the time over which compensation payments may be due, the injury
or illness need not be service-connected. It suffices that at the time of
illness or injury the claimant be in the employ of the ship. The ability
to recover indemnity for injuries incurred because of unseaworthiness,
as well as for injuries due to the negligence of a fellow member of the
crew, gives the seaman an advantage over employees covered by an
employers' liability act, since ordinarily the basic requirement for the
latter class of employees is that they must show fault, while the seaman
need not show negligence when the injury is the result of unseaworthi-
ness. If there is a showing of either fault or unseaworthiness, the qeaman
recovers a lump sum. This chance at recovery of a large sum counter-
balances the comparatively (with respect to compensation) small amount
which may be recovered in any event under the doctrine of maintenance
and cure. However, there is a serious question as to the ultimate sound-
ness of our legal system as it applies to injuries received by seamen.
Injuries to land employees, except railway employees, are. covered
by state compensation acts; longshoremen and other harbor workers are
covered by either state or federal compensation acts. If the injury is in-
curred on board ship in the course of maritime employment the Federal
Harbor Workers' Act applies; 5" otherwise the state act controls. Other
maritime countries, generally, have brought seamen's injuries within the
principle of compensation. Apparently, in those countries and in the
United States, insofar as land workers who are not railway employees are
concerned, it has been thought that the fairest course to follow in allotting
54 Cf. Stapp v. Steamboat Clyde, 43 Minn. 192, 45 N.W. 430 (i890). See
dicta in the dissenting opinion of Brewer, J., in The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S.
17 51-52 (1903).
55 Cf. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, (1871).
56 The federal act controls when state law may not be applied. State law
is inapplicable where the employee is engaged in maritime work and the injury
is incurred on navigable water. See cases cited note 27, supra.
[Vol. 17
1956] THE JONES ACT 493
the burden of the risks arising out of industrial accidents is through resort
to the principles of compensation. A not uncommon argument is that the
dangerous nature of the seaman's calling requires special and generous
consideration of his injuries or illnesses. However, a seaman on a grain
or ore ship on the Great Lakes does not follow a more dangerous calling
than a steel worker or an employee of a grain elevator in one of the
cities to which the ship may be carrying its cargo. The work of a deck-
hand on an Ohio River tug and its coal barges is probably no more
dangerous than that of many industrial workers in the Ohio Valley.
The same is true with respect to the seaman on a tanker out of a Gulf
Coast city when compared with a worker in a refinery in Beaumont,
Port Arthur or Baton Rouge. The picture of the poor friendless mariner
at the mercy of the owner or ship's officer seems an anachronism in this
day of highly organized unions. Indeed, the relationship of seamen and
owners has been reversed. If operators do not meet union demands,
ships do not sail.
